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Post-quantum concepts

The cryptography and threat model RelixQ is built on: what Shor and Grover break, why harvest-now-decrypt-later is a present-day problem, the Mosca inequality, and the NIST algorithms that replace what breaks.

NIST standards
FIPS 203 / 204 / 205
CRQC status
None exists
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What quantum computing actually breaks

Two quantum algorithms matter, and they do very different amounts of damage. Conflating them is the most common source of bad migration plans.

AlgorithmEffectWhat it means for you
Shor's algorithmFactors integers and computes discrete logarithms in polynomial timeBreaks RSA, DSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ECDH, and finite-field Diffie-Hellman outright. These need replacing, not resizing.
Grover's algorithmA quadratic speedup on unstructured searchHalves the effective strength of symmetric primitives — AES-128 drops to roughly 64-bit security. Mitigated by larger parameters, not replacement.

Harvest now, decrypt later

HNDL is the reason post-quantum migration is urgent before any quantum computer exists. An adversary records your encrypted traffic today, stores it cheaply, and decrypts it years later once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available.

If the data inside is still confidential at that point — health records, financial data, state secrets, long-lived credentials, source code — the breach happened the day it was harvested, not the day it was decrypted. Nothing was "hacked" today, and that is precisely what makes it easy to under-prioritize.

Three conditions have to hold at once for a flow to be genuinely HNDL-exposed, and all three are needed — which is why algorithm counts alone are a poor prioritization signal:

  1. 1The cryptography is quantum-vulnerable — a Shor-breakable key establishment protects the flow.
  2. 2The traffic is harvestable — a passive collector can actually capture it. Internet-exposed beats partner-exposed beats internal-only; not harvestable means never HNDL-relevant, no matter how weak the algorithm.
  3. 3The data still matters later — its confidentiality lifetime extends past the point where the cryptography becomes breakable.

The Mosca inequality

The third condition has a standard formulation: act now if X + Y > Z.

TermWhat it is
XConfidentiality horizon — how many years the data must stay secret. Patient genomes: decades. Session tokens: hours.
YMigration time — how many years your organization needs to migrate the affected cryptography.
ZTime to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC).

Read it as a race. If the years your data must remain secret plus the years it takes you to migrate exceed the years until a CRQC, then traffic harvested today will still matter when it becomes breakable — the exposure already exists, even though the decryption capability does not.

Practical rule of thumb, independent of any product: if your data confidentiality lifetime exceeds roughly 5–10 years, start migrating now.

What replaces what

NIST standardized the first post-quantum replacements in August 2024. RelixQ names concrete targets rather than telling you to "use PQC".

StandardAlgorithmReplaces
FIPS 203ML-KEM (formerly Kyber)RSA key transport, ECDH and DH key agreement
FIPS 204ML-DSA (formerly Dilithium)RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA signatures
FIPS 205SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+)Signatures, where a conservative hash-based construction is preferred
NIST SP 800-208LMS / XMSS / HSSCode and firmware signing (stateful hash-based)

Regulatory clocks

The Mosca inequality gives a per-data-flow answer to "when?". Mandates give a calendar answer. For most organizations the harvest-now horizon binds earlier than any regulator does.

AuthorityWhat it requiresTimeline
NIST IR 8547112-bit-security classical asymmetric algorithms — RSA-2048, ECDSA P-256 — deprecated, then disallowedDeprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035
NSA CNSA 2.0PQC for US National Security Systems2030–2033
BSI (Germany)PQC for federal and critical infrastructure2026–2030
EU NIS2Quantum-readiness reporting for essential and important entitiesIn force
EU DORACrypto-agility evidence for ICT risk managementIn force

Mapping RelixQ output onto these frameworks is covered in Standards and compliance.

The honesty stance

That stance has two practical consequences you will meet on every screen and in every export. First, claims are typed: proven (a reproducible classical break in a local sandbox), modeled (a dated exposure window or a cited cost estimate, nothing executed), or observed (a read-only negotiation fact). Second, absent data is shown as absent: a scope that has never been scanned reads Not yet assessed, never 100 and never green.

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